Jackson’s initial position at the northern end of the Confederate line when the battle began. Protected to his west by Stuart’s cavalry, this is where the initial Union attack under MG Joseph Hooker’s I Corps fell.

Morning:  The battle commenced in earnest when MG Joe Hooker’s I Union Corps slammed into Jackson’s left, deployed along the edge of the West Woods. Mansfield’s XII Union Corps came in on Hooker’s left to place further pressure on Jackson’s men, with significant close-in fighting taking place in a cornfield, tall and ripe this late in the summer. Additional reinforcement by Sumner’s II Union Corps placed irresistible pressure on Jackson’s corps and the Confederate troops on the eastern end of his line were forced to pull back on a line with Dunker Church in order to protect their flanks. Meanwhile Sumner’s corps made contact with the troops of Longstreet’s Confederates along “Bloody Lane”, a sunken road providing advantageous positions from which to fire into the densely packed Union regiments.

Looking north toward the cornfield through which Mansfield’s XII Union Corps advanced to meet Jackson’s veteran troops.

The extreme right of Jackson’s line. These men would be forced back by pressure from two Union corps to establish a line between the North Woods and Dunkel Church.


Midday: With the apparent success by Sumner’s II Corps, his divisions pressed onward. Sedgewick’s division continue to pressure Jackson’s withdrawing troops while the rest of the corps attempted to punch through the center of the Confederate line, near where the two Southern corps met. The southern portion of this linkage included a sunken road which due north south for a distance of nearly 800 meters. Longstreet’s men occupied this defensive position, destined to be called “Bloody Lane” for the 5,600 lives expended fighting over the position. Longstreet’s men held through multiple frontal assaults and the Confederate line stabilized to his left.

The rolling farmland leading to the Bloody Lane. Sumner’s II Corps advanced across this open area to be torn apart by accurate rifle fire from Longstreet’s men hidden in the sunken road. The observation tower in center frame lies at the end of that road, which stretches off unseen into the foliage to the right. Crossing this open field, the Irish Brigade took 540 casualties attempting the 4th frontal assault of the day by II Corps.

Looking south along Bloody Lane, it may not seem to be the most imposing of defenses, yet the ability to fire from cover into troops advancing in the open made a tremendous difference, and the Confederate troops exacted a heavy toll on the waves of Union troops that sought to carry the position.

A view of Bloody Lane looking north from the top of the observation tower. Confederate troops lined the banks of this sunken road and poured innumerable volleys into Union troops assaulting from the right side of the picture. The tall monument at the top right indicates the rough vicinity of Dunkel Church.


Afternoon: As fighting died down at the northern and central segments of the Confederate line, MG Burnside’s IX Union Corps arrived at the far side of Rohrbach Bridge. Across the stream, a single confederate brigade some 3,000 strong under BG Robert Toombs held the steep heights. Burnside’s corps, roughly 12,500 troops, would waste much of the afternoon—and countless lives—trying to cross the bridge under intense rifle fire. As Toombs’s men ran low on ammunition, he decided to withdraw, finally allowing Burnside’s men to cross the creek, intent upon assaulting Longstreet’s exposed right flank. The timely arrival on the Antietam battlefield of Confederate MG A.P. Hill would prevent the Union from achieving a decisive stroke and the Union forces, utterly spent by their ordeal at what would later be called “Burnside Bridge”, would withdraw, bringing the battle to a close.

View across Burnside Bridge facing east from where the Union IX Corps attacked repeatedly.

Note the shallowness of the creek that Burnside Bridge spans. Confederate officers noted at the time their incredulity that IX Corps didn’t just wade across in one long line. This action would significantly tarnish the military reputation of MG Ambrose Burnside as his delay in crossing the bridge allowed A.P. Hill’s troops to take the positions from which they would later blunt what might have otherwise been a decisive strike into the unprotected right flank of Longstreet’s corps.