The low stone wall partway up Marye’s Heights. The open space between this position and the last cover provided by Fredericksburg buildings made the open area a true killing ground.
Union I and II Corps under Hooker and Sumner respectively, led the assault across the twin bridges, and through the town of Fredericksburg. The terrain sloped gently upward toward a manor house atop a hill called Marye’s Heights, skirted by a low, stone wall. Confederate forces under LTG James Longstreet dug in along the heights with infantrymen four-deep stacked up behind the stone wall, allowing an incredible rate of fire from the otherwise slow-loading muzzle-loading rifles. The slaughter they wreaked upon the two Union corps would move even the Confederate shooters to acts of mercy. Once again, the Irish Brigade found itself condemned to another killing field and again these men paid a high price in blood for what was, it seems, intended to be a supporting attack.
Close-up image of the Union side of the stone wall. The terrain slopes downward off to the right until reaching the river a mile or so away. 3,000 Georgians occupied this wall and poured unrelenting fire into the advancing Union troops.
Here you can see the Marye House atop Marye’s Heights. Artillery and more infantry atop the heights could fire safely over the heads of the Georgians below, the sunken road that extended out from the stone wall, barely visible in the foreground. Regardless, few advancing Union soldiers would have made it even this close to either the road or the house.
Another view of the stone wall and sunken road behind it. Two full Union corps would break upon this hardened, well-defended Confederate position.
Confederate positions south of Fredericksburg. You can still see the indentations in the ground before the cannon, marking the trenchlines of Jackson’s command. From this height, the terrain gently slopes down toward the Rappahannok below. MG William B. Franklin’s Left Grand Division of some 60,000 men would attempt to take these heights, though he never fully committed the full measure of his force.
South of the city, Franklin’s huge force of 60,000 men was ordered to make the main attack against Jackson’s corps entrenched atop the heights. Receiving vague orders from Burnside—and those fairly late in the morning—Franklin’s assault was less, perhaps, than what the commander had intended. Timed to occur at the same time as Sumner’s attack up Marye’s Heights, with Hooker’s force in support, Franklin was to break and then turn the Confederate line, forcing Longstreet to abandon his strong position above Fredericksburg. Instead, Franklin failed to take advantage of a minor piercing of Jackson’s line, and that attack too was thrown back.
Meade’s Pyramid, where MG George G. Meade’s command penetrated Jackson’s long, thin line. Had this success been reinforced, the Battle of Fredericksburg might have had a very different ending. Still, this point remains several hundred meters below the crest wherein Jackson’s artillery and infantry reserves were stationed and so overall success would still not have been a given.
The ground between the left and right flank was fairly dense woods. The Confederate Army was forced to cover this ground and did so with a long thin line of dug-in troops. The ground being not suitable for any other real purpose, the trenches of these Southern troops remain, and can still be traced through the woods. The battlefield road that leads to Jackson’s position south of the city follows this trenchline closely.
The extreme right of Jackson’s position, looking down upon Meade’s Pyramid, marking the Confederate front lines originally held by A.P. Hill’s division.
