The unique cupola atop Gettysburg College was visible for some distance. This picture was taken from McPherson’s Ridge, the first fallback position for Buford’s cavalry on 1 July 1863.
Day 1: On 1 July, BG John Buford’s cavalry spotted Confederate troops west of the crossroads town of Gettysburg in Pennsylvania. Looking around he quickly decided that his men needed to protect the high ground east and south of the city lest it fall into Confederate hands. His brigade of dismounted cavalry fought off an entire division of Confederate MG A. P. Hill’s corps before being forced backward to McPherson’s Ridge. It was here that MG John Reynolds and his I Corps of infantry first arrived and strengthened the Union line. As more Union troops arrived so too were more of Hill’s corps fed into the fight until the pressure forced the Yankees back through the town to occupy the heights beyond from Culp’s Hill in the north, along Cemetary Ridge, and ending at Little Round Top to the south.
McPherson’s Ridge is barely worthy of its name, but it remains the only real elevation west of Gettysburg for some distance. It was here that Buford’s hard-pressed cavalry were relieved by infantry of the Union I Corps. MG Reynolds would be struck down soon after effecting linkup, but his aggressive march to the sound of the guns may have saved Union fortunes at Gettysburg.
This railroad cut featured prominently on the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg. It was here that Union I Corps troops halted Confederate attacks from north of the Chambersburg Pike (just left of this picture) that otherwise seemed to be leading to a breakthrough. The stalwart resistance here allowed more and more Union Corps to arrive and deploy to defensive positions east and south of the town.
Another view of the town of Gettysburg from McPherson’s Ridge. Many of the original buildings still stand today and you can imagine this being roughly the view experienced by A. P. Hill’s victorious troops as they pushed their opponents off the ridge and through the town.
The view south from Culp’s Hill, at the northeastern end of the Union line. General opinion then and now is that MG Richard S. Ewell’s delay in following Lee’s vaguely worded order to attack and take the hill left too much time for MG Slocum’s XII Corps to fortify the heights, leading to multiple failed Confederate attempts to storm the heights on 2 July 1863. The symmetrically shaped hill in left center of the frame is Round Top. The Union line then swung to the right of this picture to Cemetery Hill, turning and running south along Cemetery Ridge to Little Round Top just short of Round Top. The critical fighting on 2 July would take place at that far extremity.
Day 2: On 2 July 1863 Lee ordered his left and rightmost corps commanders to attack the extreme ends of the extended Union line. Those attacks would fall on Culp’s Hill east of Gettysburg, and Little Round Top to the south. Not realizing MG Dan Sickles had moved his corps well forward from positions on Cemetery Ridge, Longstreet’s corps bungled into Union troops near the Peach Orchard, pushing them back through the Wheatfield and Devil’s Den before reaching the base of Little Round Top. Colonel Vincent’s small brigade managed to hold of successive attacks by Longstreet’s men throughout the day. Especially noteworthy was the determined resistance of the 20th Maine Volunteers which had the dubious honor of occupying the extreme left of the Union position. Their stubborn refusal to give ground left hundreds of Confederate casualties sprawled amongst the rocky terrain and prevented Longstreet from turning the Union left.
The Devil’s Den was a protrusion of boulders and generally rocky terrain at the base of Round Top Hill. Longstreet’s corps, pushed Sickles’s corps out of the Peach Orchard and Devil’s Den during the approach march to Little Round Top. Unsuitable for deployment of formed infantry, it fast became a nest of sharpshooters and individual marksmen that would harass Union troops on Little Round Top throughout the rest of the battle.
What would today be considered ideal infantry terrain, Devil’s Den is a warren of hard cover providing excellent fields of fire toward Union troops on Little Round Top.
The view of Little Round Top from Devil’s Den, highlighting just how close these two terrain features actually were. Longstreet’s Corps would break itself trying to take that hill due in no small part to the dogged determination of the 20th Maine Volunteers led by COL Joshua Chamberlain. This unit held all afternoon fighting off waves of Confederate attacks, making a final, climactic charge down the hill when the men had run out of ammunition. This intense, small-scale battle within the larger battle left the Union left flank intact, and the Confederates still looking up at their opponents in defensible terrain.
The monument to the 20th Maine Volunteer Regiment honoring the men lost during their legendary stand atop Little Round Top. Successive Confederate attacks rotated around to the south, to the point where Chamberlain had to thin his line and refuse his left flank to keep from being enveloped. Ultimately his effort—and the determined stand by his volunteers—under intense fire, saved the Union line.
Round Top Hill from the vantage point of the 20th Maine. Meade’s army just didn’t have enough men to stretch that far to the south and it has long been conjectured that if Longstreet had gotten some guns up onto that hill, he might have rendered the positions on Little Round Top—and maybe the entire Union position—untenable.
Looking north from the slope of Little Round Top, this view highlights just how high above the local terrain the rocky hill stood. Union lines at the beginning of the first day stretched along the woodline visible mid-frame along the left edge of this picture. By the end of the day, however, most of MG Dan Sickles’s corps had fallen back to Cemetery Ridge leaving the 20th Maine exposed to the fury of Longstreet’s assault.
A view north from the extreme tip of Little Round Top making it easy to follow the monuments which mark the Union line running north toward Cemetery Hill. The following day’s finale would have been very visible from this, now safe, height.
Some of the 170 Confederate guns firing in support of Longstreet’s assault of the Union center on 3 July 1863. The rebel guns would literally fire until out of ammunition in an attempt to soften the federal line, all to no avail as Pickett’s Charge failed to take the Yankee defenses.
Day 3: Lee, having failed to breakthrough on either Union flank reckoned the enemy center must be weak. Meade, coming to the same conclusion, reinforced his center with men from Dan Sickles’s corps, survivors from the previous day’s fighting on the south flank. 12,500 men comprising MG George Pickett’s division, Pettigrew’s division on his left, and Anderson’s division to the right. Pickett’s men aimed their attack at the Angle, a protrusion in the Union line protected by a low stone wall but visible due to a copse of trees within. The distance between Seminary Ridge and the Union lines atop Cemetery Ridge was almost exactly a mile, all of which was well within Union artillery range from the ridge ahead, Cemetery Hill to the north, and Little Round Top to the south. The artillery opened great gaps in the brown-grey lines of men, with rifle fire adding to the rebels’ misery when the range was right. Still, amid all this hot lead, BG Armistead’s brigade managed to penetrate the Angle before being thrown back to Seminary Ridge. Pickett’s division was ruined and Lee was forced to retreat back to Virginia beginning the next day, the 4th of July.
The North Carolina monument along the treeline on Seminary Ridge from where Pickett’s Division of Longstreet’s Corps set off on their fateful advance. Feeling the Union Army had proven itself strong on its flanks the previous day, Lee reckoned it must be weak in the center. It was a fatal misjudgment and cost him 2,655 casualties in less than an hour, over 50% of Pickett’s command.
The view east toward the Union lines. It was this distance—all of which lay within artillery range—across which Pickett’s Division marched on 3 July 1863. Very few would ever make it to the Union lines.
Taken from Seminary Ridge, this picture zooms in a bit to show the Union monuments which mark the rear of their lines along Cemetery Ridge. It’s a lot of open ground to cover no matter how you look at it!
This is a view to the west from the rear of the Angle, a recognizable protrusion from the Union lines atop Cemetery Ridge. The dark treeline across the way marks Seminary Ridge, the jump off point of Pickett’s charge.
This was taken from the forward edge of the Angle, where two regiments of BG Alexander Webb’s Philadelphia Brigade held position behind a low stone wall, offering significant protection against Confederate fire. As the Confederate artillery barrage subsided they’d have watched Pickett’s Division form up along the far woodline, seen the great holes torn into their formations by Webb’s two guns and other Union artillery along the line, waiting for the ragged enemy lines to come into rifle range before pouring a withering fire into the rebels.
On display here with its caisson to the rear of the angle, reports from the day of the battle indicate Webb’s two guns were pushed forward to the edge of the position, ugly black barrels protruding out over the top of the stone wall. Regardless, the short distance between the angle and Seminary Ridge should give some indication just how artillery firing shot, then canister, and finally double canister would have wreaked absolute havoc upon the grey-clad regiments advancing to their doom.
This simple stone marks the place where BG Lewis “Lo” Armistead fell, his men having briefly penetrated the Angle on 3 July 1863. Armistead had ordered the two captured cannon be turned on the Union troops but his men found the last of the ammunition had already been expended firing on the rebels as they’d crossed the intervening ground. This was the high water mark of the Confederacy and the shell-shocked rebels were soon thrown back in disarray. Armistead, close pre-war friend of Union MG Winfield Scott Hancock, commander of the Union II Corps, was shot three times after crossing the stone wall though non of the wounds was, by itself, fatal. What was left of his brigade straggled back to Seminary Ridge and he died two days later in a Union field hospital of a presumed bacterial infection.
