Today the U.S. and Japan celebrate the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Technically, the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America” this auspicious day was marked with ceremonies, long speeches, and lots of congratulations. It was a positive day for both countries and for a brief moment people in both nations might reflect on what made such an odd pairing—bitter enemies just 75 years ago—last for so long.
We take for granted the word “alliance”. We use it to mean office conspirator, reality show frenemy, and often treat it as a synonym for “friend”. And just like words such as “war” and “battle” have been used in ways that don’t necessarily reflect a savage combat wherein opponents quite literally are attempting with all their might to kill one another, I think the words “ally” and “alliance” have slowly lost their true meaning for the vast majority of the public.
The UK’s Henry John Temple, Lord of Palmerston, and twice Prime Minister, once declared that “Nations do not have permanent friends or enemies, only interests.” This is worth thinking about for a moment or two as it helps to explain the rationale for some of the stranger alliances the US has been involved in over the years. It’s also noteworthy, I think, that Lord Palmerston expressed a distinction, however subtle, between interstate relationships and national interests by describing the former as permanent but leaving open the possibility that the latter can change over time. This is very important, and bears keeping in mind when trying to understand why an alliance breaks down.
So, what exactly does it really mean to be an “ally”? The inference, on the national level, is that the word connotes a military alliance, a security relationship whereby one nation comes to the aid of the other in a time of national security crisis. That by itself goes a bit beyond what a typical office ally might be willing to do for another … “Gladys finished the coffee and didn’t make more … again … will you help me kill her, destroy her crops, subjugate her people, and move the kids and dog into her house?” Okay, okay, but you get the idea. This is how allies have historically assisted one another on the world stage. Don’t believe me? Ask the ancient Assyrians, toppled by a coalition in 612 BC, mighty Carthage, erased by a Roman-dominated confederation in 149 BC, the Byzantine Empire, ruined when an Ottoman Turk-led coalition seized Constantinople in 1453 AD, Napoleon’s France, brought to heel by a virtual who’s who of European nations in 1815, Germany, defeated by massive coalitions in two back-to-back world wars ending in 1918 and 1945 … and, of course, Japan itself.
Those last two entries are interesting, aren’t they, since in both cases—each currently an ally of the United States—their military partner today greatly facilitated their defeat in the last war. I’ve long since referred to such nations as members of the E2AP … the Enemies to Allies Program. A bit tongue-in-cheek, perhaps, but the phenomenon is not at all unique. Often throughout history a subdued enemy is enticed—or forced—to become an ally of their conqueror. The Romans were masters of this practice and it helped them dominate the Mediterranean world for nearly 500 years. Last year they might have been killing Gauls, but this year, there are Gallic cavalry supporting the campaign against the Illyrians. Often, those supporting allied troops had indeed been last season’s foes. Talk about awkward conversations around the campfire!
The US too, it seems, favors this approach to post-conflict diplomacy and security, generally to good effect. France and England, charter members of the E2AP since sometime after the end of the French-Indian War in 1763 and War of 1812 respectively, have been long-standing allies of the US through countless world crises, innumerable wars, and way too many casualties. They remain close to the US even today. Germany and Japan have both been allies of the US since their defeat in WWII, though the relationship manifests itself in very different ways.
The Germans, their position in central Europe making them a virtual cornerstone of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, were encouraged to rebuild a credible military force, then integrated into what essentially became an “Army of the West” set in opposition to an Eastern, Soviet-led juggernaut. In Japan, however, with no similar Sword of Damacles suspended overhead, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers—none other than Douglas MacArthur himself—ensured that Japan’s post-war constitution all but forbade that nation from future militancy. What that meant in terms of alliance, then, was that the Mutual Security Treaty, as it is generally called, is not actually mutual. The US is required to come to Japan’s aid, but not the other way around. While not necessarily well-understood by the US public, this is an aspect that makes Japan’s position in relation to other US allies both unique and interesting.
In real terms on the ground, then, what this means is that British, French, Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, German, Italian, and South Korean troops—to name but a few—have made their appearances fighting alongside US forces since the 9-11 attacks. Not so Japan, prohibited by their constitution from using force as a means to settle interstate problems, and not required by treaty to join the fight. That Japan has provided assistance—albeit by means best described as non-combat support—is a fascinating development. To a certain degree it reflects a strong desire by the very nation that created the current restrictions—Japan’s only ally—for their partner to contribute more to peace and stability around the world.
Japan’s postwar economic recovery left it with worldwide interests that need protecting, and the government is very aware of the precarious negotiating position they are in when anyone with an internet connection can discern Japan’s unlikeliness to use force to accomplish that protection. This, in a nutshell, is Japan’s 21st Century security conundrum as deterrence can only be achieved if a potential threat truly believes you can and will apply armed force. While Japan can, of course, legally defend itself if attacked, virtually anything short of naked armed aggression leaves the country with few military options. This is why Japan’s international engagement so heavily favors the Economic sphere, as the world’s third largest economy has far fewer restrictions on what can be accomplished through fiscal means. This is also why Japanese prime ministers cling so closely to the United States, their only treaty partner, and one that repeatedly proves its willingness to use military force to protect national—and allied—interests.
Getting back to the original topic, then, don’t wonder why the US stopped supporting Kurdish elements in Syria. Don’t ask how the US could betray a friend. Ask instead what interests changed. With Turkey and certain Kurdish elements—bitter, longstanding enemies that continued to snipe and jab at one another—in the same military camp, was it not inevitable that something would have to give? Inevitable that the US would have to someday make a choice between them? Was there really any doubt which way the US would go with that decision—you know, with a growing Russian threat and important US military bases still operating in Turkey? All emotion aside—and acknowledging this is a gross over-simplification of the problem—I don’t think so.
Lord Palmerston was right in that there is no such thing as enduring friendship between nations, no matter how much it might look that way on the ground between troops of allied states. Soldiers are soldiers, no matter from where they originate, and they’ll always have more in common with one another than with the bureaucrats and politicians who order them into battle. Once it’s determined that a given force is an ally, it becomes their mission to build tactical-level relationships that make working together not only possible, but beneficial. Their lives depend on it after all. But the larger issues of state won’t ever be decided by the guys trading cigarettes and baseball caps with allied fighters. Those larger issues will always reflect concern for the protection of national-level interests.
The most effective way to ensure an alliance endures, then, is to make sure the shared foundational interests endure. Capitalism, democracy, freedom of the press and religion, a preference for regional and world stability, these shared interests are what keep Japan and the US tied so closely together. They seem likely to remain shared interests for the foreseeable future. Yet history offers a warning as to what can happen when one side takes an alliance for granted, forgetting for one reason or another the security arrangement is inherently based upon shared, sometimes slippery, national interests. Spoiler alert: it’s generally not good!
And so today, the US and Japan celebrate the signing of the Mutual Security Treaty in 1960. Some 50,000 US troops remain forward-deployed across the island nation as concrete evidence of the US commitment to Japan’s defense, and the stability of the Far East. Neither party should ever forget just how fragile even the oldest alliance can be. As well, both need to bear in mind the core interests that continue to make the alliance worthwhile.
Happy 60th Anniversary—I swear you don’t look a day over 50!
M. G. Haynes